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Abstract
This paper presents a formal game-theoretic model to explain the simultane-
ity problem that has made it dicult to obtain unbiased estimates of the
eects of both incumbent and challenger spending in U.S. House elections.
The model predicts a particular form of correlation between the expected
closeness of the race and the level of spending by both candidates, which im-
plies that the simultaneity problem should not be present in close races, and
should be progressively more severe in range of safe races that are empirically
observed. This is conrmed by comparing simple OLS regression of races
that are expected to be close with races that are expected not to be close,
using House incumbent races spanning two decades. The theory also implies
that inclusion of a variable controlling for total spending should successfully
produce reliable estimates using OLS. This is conrmed.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents new estimates of the eects of spending by incumbents and by
challengers on the vote in U.S. House elections. As is well known, estimation via OLS
regression produces strong coecients for challenger spending but virtually no eect for
incumbent spending (e.g., Jacobson, 1978). Few would argue, however, that incumbent
spending does not matter. The obvious reason for the near-zero coecients for incum-
bent spending using OLS is a simultaneity bias, as incumbents spend more when they
are in electoral trouble. Somewhat less obvious, and less commonly acknowledged, the
opposite bias is present for challenger spending. Challengers spend more when their
prospects are good. In short, estimates of spending eects via OLS are biased because
one is not controlling for candidate expectations of the vote, and these expectations drive
spending decisions. This paper addresses this problem directly by formulating and solv-
ing a game-theoretic model of campaign spending, and identifying the ner structure of
these simultaneity problems in a precise way. This characterization of the equilibrium
of the spending game has direct implications about how to obtain reliable estimates of
incumbent and challenger spending eects, without resorting to multi-equation systems.
Several statistical solutions have been proposed to estimate the eects of incumbent
spending by overcoming the simultaneity bias. The most common solution is two-stage
least squares, whereby instrumental variables are used as proxies for observed spending.
In the best-known of these 2SLS exercises, Green and Krasno (1988) used lagged incum-
bent spending as an instrument for incumbent spending, and found signicant eects
for incumbent spending. In an alternative approach, Erikson and Palfrey (1993, 1997)
achieved statistical identication by means of restrictions on the variance-covariance ma-
trix. By assuming that the covariances between each spending variable and the vote were
caused by only vote-on-spending and spending-on-vote eects, they too found signicant
eects for incumbent spending, somewhat larger in magnitude than Green and Krasno
(1988), but still signicantly smaller than challenger spending eects. In still a third ap-
proach, Abramowitz (1991) used OLS but attempted to neutralize the simultaneity bias
by using Congressional Quarterly forecasts of election outcomes as a control for expec-
tations. Continuing to nd negligible coecients for incumbent spending even with this
control, Abramowitz concluded that incumbent spending actually has little impact on
the vote. In sum, due to seemingly unavoidable methodological diculties, a consensus
has not yet emerged regarding both the relative and absolute magnitudes of incumbent
and challenger spending eects on congressional election outcomes. Methodologies more
complex than OLS show appreciable eects for incumbent spending, but are themselves
dependent on new assumptions of their own and still produce surprisingly small incum-
bency spending eects. And, moreover, the fact that the biased OLS estimates show
incumbent spending to be ineectual oers a handle for doubt that incumbent spending
matters.
The present paper takes a new approach to estimating spending eects. We estimate
spending eects via OLS, for a subset of congressional districts where a game-theoretic
model predicts that the simultaneity bias should be minimal or nonexistent. This subset
2
consists of those districts where the eect of new sources of challenger vote support do
not necessarily drive up challenger and incumbent spending. Which districts are these?
They are districts where, before taking spending into account, the vote is expected to be
close or even slightly favor the challenger. Where the expectation is a close race, both
spending eects can be reliably estimated by simple OLS. In addition, the theoretical
model also implies that inclusion of a variable controlling for total spending, should
successfully produce reliable estimates using OLS. This is also conrmed in our analysis.
We present the theoretical model in the next section, and present the data analysis in
subsequent sections.
2 Theory: The Spending Game
The empirical results we report below can be understood in the context of the simple
spending game model of Erikson and Palfrey (1993). That model is meant to capture
the strategic aspect of competitive spending by two competing candidates for oce,
candidate I (the incumbent) and candidate C (the challenger). It has the following basic
features. Each candidate cares about the probability of winning more than 50% of the
vote in the election. The probability I wins is determined by district characteristics,
short-term forces, candidate characteristics, campaign spending, and chance. For the
moment, treat the rst three categories of variables as exogenously xed. Given xed
values of these variables, we summarize the eects of campaign spending and chance by
a simple function, P , which denotes the incumbent's probability of winning as a function
of spending by each of the two candidates. Thus, each candidate can raise and spend
money in the campaign, and the outcome of the election is a function of how much each
candidate spends and some random noise.
Raising campaign resources is a costly activity for candidates. Promises must be
made, issue positions compromised, fund-raisers must be attended, and so forth. This is
formally represented by two fund-raising cost functions, one for each of the two candi-
dates. The two functions could be dierent, reecting cost advantages, scale economies,
and other dierences in fund-raising costs that might exist between an incumbent and a
challenger. The nal piece of the equation is the value of winning. We denote this value
by V
I
and V
C
, respectively, for the incumbent and the challenger. Denoting the spending
levels by S
I
and S
C
respectively, the payo functions to the two candidates are given by:
U
I
(S
I
; S
C
) = V
I
P (S
I
; S
C
)  C
I
(S
I
)
U
C
(S
I
; S
C
) = V
C
[1  P (S
I
; S
C
)]  C
C
(S
C
)
Thus, for the incumbent, the optimal level of spending, S
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, given some level of spend-
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C
, is characterized by the solution
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Similarly, for the challenger, we have:
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In equilibrium, these conditions would simultaneously be satised for both candidates,
so an equilibrium would be a pair (S
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The basic components of this model, V
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) can be ex-
pected to vary a great deal across districts and across elections, depending on the parti-
sanship of the district, current political conditions, and candidate specic features, such
as name recognition, political talent, and previous experience. We consider a special
version of the model below, which focuses on the P function. Specically, suppose that
actual incumbent share of the vote is equal to some expected share of the vote, , plus
a random term, and that spending aects the expected share of the vote. The random
term is Normally distributed with variance 
2
. Then it follows that we can write
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where  is the Normal cumulative distribution function. Substituting into the equilibrium
conditions above, this yields the following two equations:
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where ' is the Normal density function. Since ' is monotonically decreasing in the
absolute value of its argument, and if we make the standard assumption that cost func-
tions are convex, then this implies that both parties spend more in elections that are
expected to be close. For example, if cost functions are quadratic then spending will be
1
Here we are assuming that the second-order conditions for a local maximum are satised. See
Erikson and Palfrey (1993) for details.
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proportional to the Normal density evaluated at the expected incumbency vote margin.
In gure 1 we show a scatter plot of the logarithm of (real) challenger spending in all
veteran (i.e. non-freshman) contested House elections between 1972 and 1990 against
actual vote
2
.
Figure 1 about here.
To illustrate how good a t this is with this simple Normal{quadratic model, we have
superimposed a tted nonlinear regression
3
line, using locally weighted least square, or
LOWESS (Cleveland, 1979). This has a shape which resembles the bell curve signature of
a Normal distribution, with a maximum near to 50% of the incumbent vote, as predicted.
A similar graph for incumbent spending as a function of vote shows a similar t in gure
2.
Figure 2 about here.
The dierence in the variances of the two implied density functions of gures 1 and
2 could be attributed to dierences in fund-raising costs between incumbents and the
challengers, or to the fact that a signicant fraction of incumbent spending occurs inde-
pendent of any challenge at all (Erikson and Palfrey 1994). This is consistent with the
above game theoretic model of optimal spending decisions by candidates, which provides
a rigorous foundation for what common sense suggests should be a basic law of campaign
spending: all else equal, both candidates will spend more when the election is expected
to be close.
This picture clearly indicates the nature of the measurement problem in estimating the
eects of challenger and incumbent spending on the vote. Since the range of (expected)
incumbent vote in contested House elections is almost entirely restricted between 55%
to 80%, there is necessarily a spurious negative correlation between incumbent spending
and incumbent share of the vote, while there is a positive correlation between challenger
spending and the incumbent share of the vote. Thus any simple one equation model will
generally overestimate the negative eect of challenger spending and underestimate the
positive eect of incumbent spending on the incumbent share of the vote. What can be
done to alleviate this?
Obviously, if the scatter plots between vote and spending were completely at, there
would be no estimation problem of the sort described above. Moreover, the severity of
the problem is roughly proportional to the slope of the spending/vote curves. Notice
that this slope is theoretically (and, it turns out, empirically) the attest for races that
are expected to be very close, and it becomes steeper as we move in the direction of
relatively safe races for incumbents. This implies that simple OLS estimation of the
eect of spending on vote using close races
4
will produce reasonable estimates, while the
2
This is not exactly the correct graph to use, since the theory predicts the relationship should hold
between spending and expected vote, rather than actual vote. A similar pattern is found if we use any
of several measures of expected vote rather than actual vote. This is presented in a later section.
3
The t is done using a bandwidth of .20.
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Or, more precisely, races that are expected to be close.
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same kind of simple OLS estimation of the eects of spending on vote using only \safe"
races, will generate estimates that grossly exaggerate the eect of challenger spending
and grossly underestimate the eect of incumbent spending. And, of course, the usual
OLS estimates obtained by pooling the entire sample falls in between these two extremes.
3 Data Analysis
For our empirical analysis, we start with a set of virtually all House election outcomes,
during the periods 1974-80 and 1982-90, involving veteran incumbents. We rst generate
a reduced form equation, where we predict the incumbent vote from a host of exogenous
variables: the lagged incumbent vote, the district's presidential vote for the incumbent's
party (1976 in the 1970s, 1988 in the 1980s), plus eects for year, incumbent party, a
dummy for southern states, and the relevant interaction terms.
5
Because this reduced-
form equation is lengthy and tangential to the central point of this paper, we do not
present it here. It accounts for 58 percent of the variance in the veteran incumbent vote.
We exploit this equation to obtain an expected incumbent vote. This \expected vote" is
not identical to the expected vote that candidates themselves observe, but we consider
it a good measure of the candidates' expected vote that is uncontaminated by spending
eects.
Armed with a composite measure of the expected vote that spans two decades of
elections, we are in a position to pool \close" contests scattered across eight separate
election years. We measure close elections in two ways. Most obviously, we use our
measure of the expected vote itself to select contests anticipated to be close. As a
cross-check, we also use Congressional Quarterly forecasts to select contests identied by
Congressional Quarterly as too close to call. Having thus identied a small set of close
contests, we use OLS to estimate the eects of incumbent and challenger spending on
the vote. As a further control for exogenous factors, we also include in the equations the
measure of the expected vote.
3.1 Responsiveness of Spending to the Expected Vote
First, we show the eect of the expected closeness of the race on spending. Simply
put, both candidates should be spending more in a race that is expected to be close.
Furthermore, this relationship should become stronger in safe races, eventually levelling
out for \blowout" races. This is an immediate consequence of the theoretical model above.
In an earlier section, we showed that even using the actual vote, spending patterns were
roughly consistent with the equilibrium predictions. here we take a closer look, using
5
Party and year eects are always combined to represent the joint eect of party and year. Among
presidential vote, south, and decade (1970s vs. 1980s), all possible interactions are included. We omit
only those veteran races lacking a current or lagged major-party opponent and those complicated by
redistricting.
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our ex ante measure of expected incumbent share of the vote, rather than actual vote.
Figure 3 shows spending in our eight selected election years
6
as a function of the expected
incumbent vote, smoothed using weighted local linear regression (LOWESS).
Figure 3 about here.
Incumbent spending and challenger spending are measured in terms of logarithms, to
reect the decreasing eect of the next marginal dollar. More specically, spending is
measured as the log of spending (in 1978 dollars) plus $5000. The numbers in Figure 3
represent means using this measure by category of expected incumbent vote.
Figure 3 clearly shows that both incumbents and challengers spend more in close
races. It also shows that the expectation of victory makes it easier for incumbents to
raise cash. This is because the spending on expected-vote slope is steeper for challengers
than for incumbents. The biggest (log) spending gaps are in safe districts, where con-
tributors have an incentive to invest in (safe) incumbents but not challengers. In very
competitive districts (where the expected vote is around 50 percent), the gap between
(logged) incumbent and challenger spending virtually disappears.
For our purposes, the most interesting aspect of Figure 3 is the nonlinearity in the
slopes, corresponding to the kind of nonlinearity predicted by the theoretical model
presented in the previous section. When the expected incumbent vote falls below 55
percent or so, the spending-on-vote slopes atten considerably. We even see evidence of
the predicted sign-reversal when the incumbent's expected vote falls below 50 percent, a
fate that befell 17 incumbents. When the incumbent is expected to lose, the direction of
the relationship between the expected vote and spending reverses. Once an incumbent is
more likely to lose than win, then the greater the expected loss, the less incentive either
candidate has to spend.
3.2 Spending Eects on the Vote
Table 1 presents the OLS equations, predicting the incumbent vote from the two logged
spending variables and the expected vote, where cases are grouped based on their ex-
pected vote. Let us start with the equation for the 40 very close races with an expected
incumbent vote under 52 percent, shown in Column 1. For these contests, the means
for both the actual and predicted incumbent vote are virtually 50 percent. By theory,
if spending eects of incumbent and challenger spending are identical, we should nd
virtually identical coecients for the two spending variables, except for their sign. This
is precisely what column 1 shows.
7
Moreover, even with only 40 cases, both spending
coecients are statistically signicant.
6
All observations are plotted on the two curves, in order to give an indication of the density of cases
as a function of our expected vote measure.
7
Using conventional signicance levels, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that these coecients
are the same.
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Table 1 about here.
Column 2 expands our analysis to include the 77 cases where the expected incumbent
vote was between 52 and 55 percent. As illustrated in Figure 3, this is the beginning
of therange of the expected vote where the slopes for the eect of the vote on spending
are negative. Here, the statistical bias should create only a mild diminution of the in-
cumbent spending coecient. Column 2 shows another statistically signicant coecient
for incumbent spending, but one that is now less than
8
that for challenger spending, as
predicted.
As Figure 3 shows, when the incumbent is expected to win by about 55 percent, the
vote on spending slopes become increasingly negative, and so the bias becomes severe.
Moreover, this is where most cases are found.
9
As column 3 of Table 1 demonstrates,
for districts where the incumbent is expected to receive between 55.0 and 58.0 percent of
the vote, the incumbent spending coecient is negligible and decidedly non-signicant.
This pattern repeats itself in analysis of further categories of 3-point increments of the
expected incumbent vote. Overall, for races where the expected incumbent vote exceeds
58 percent, the simultaneity problem becomes so severe that the coecient on incumbent
spending actually reverses sign. The estimates are presented in column 4. The pooled
results for all cases are given in column 5, which produces the well-known implausible
result that challenger spending matters, but incumbent spending does not.
The cautious reader may be tempted to argue that while Table 1 shows signicant
incumbent spending in close races, where it matters most (in terms of aecting the
probability of winning), perhaps we just shouldn't care whether incumbent spending has
signicant eects on voting in safe races, since the winner would seem to be a foregone
conclusion anyway. It would be a mistake, however, to treat the coecients in Table 1,
columns 4 and 5, as anything short of seriously biased. There of course is no plausible
reason why marginal incumbents (often marginal because of their own ineptitude) would
spend eectively while safe incumbents spend ineectively. Going a step further, we
have presented a strong theoretical reason why the estimate of spending eects by safe
incumbents would be biased downward using OLS regression. Moreover, from a policy
standpoint, we should be interested in the counterfactual question of what might happen
if spending levels were dierent from the ones we observed. In order to answer such
questions, we need both a model of how spending levels are set and reliable empirical
measurement of the marginal eects of spending by both incumbents and challengers.
3.3 The CQ Expected Vote
One alternative way of measuring perceived electoral closeness deserves our attention. We
supplement our measurement of electoral expectations by incorporating Congressional
8
This dierence is almost signicant at the p=.10 level.
9
Approximately 80% of the cases (1491 out of 1792) have expected vote in the 55-75% range.
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Quarterly 's measure of the expected vote. During October of every campaign over the
two decades of this analysis, CQ rated each of the 435 House races on a scale from \safe
Democratic" to \safe Republican."
We fold this scale by incumbency, to form a scale of expected vulnerability. Following
is the list of three categories, along with their numbers of usable cases in parentheses.:
Close: Coded \Favoring the challenger or "too close to call": by CQ (N=83)
Leaning : Coded \leaning or "likely" for the incumbent by CQ (N=340)
Safe: Coded \safe" for the incumbent by CQ (N=1369)
A district's rating on this scale reects the exogenous variables that make up our
measure of the expected vote. But the rating also reects the more intangible sources
of the current vote (challenger strength, etc.) that candidates may observe during the
campaign but are not part of our equation. To the extent that CQ raters observe the same
intangible sources of the vote that candidates observe when they make their spending
decisions, the simultaneity problem becomes minimized.
This argument is not new, but originates with Abramowitz (1991). Following logic
similar to that of our previous paragraph, Abramowitz decided to include CQ expected
vote category in OLS equations predicting the incumbent vote. His analysis showed
that even with CQ ratings on the right hand side of the equation, the coecient for
incumbent spending was nonsignicant. Abramowitz concluded from this exercise that
the estimates of small incumbent spending eects were not an artifact of simultaneity
bias as commonly supposed.
A limitation on CQ ratings as a control for intangible sources of the vote is that the
CQ ratings chop the cases coarsely into only three usable categories, with 78 percent
placed in the safe category. Obviously, this categorization does not distinguish among
the dierent degrees of \safeness" for safe races. On the other hand, the CQ ratings
single out a select few races for the \close" category. Among our 83 CQ- dened \close"
races, there may be little variation in degrees of vulnerability as observed by CQ or the
candidates. In any case, CQ-coded close races are indeed very close on average, so that
the simultaneity problem is minimal. The mean incumbent vote in the CQ-dened close
races is 49.5 percent.
In our analysis that follows, we estimate the vote equation separately for the three
categories (close, leaning, and safe districts), using as right-hand side variables the log
of spending for incumbents, the log of spending for challengers, plus our measure of the
expected vote. We also show the results when we pool the cases together, with CQ
groupings on the right hand side as dummy variables. Table 2 shows the results. With
the control for CQ ratings, the spending coecients are slightly lower than those for
Table 1, for the reason that CQ ratings, which are created just a few weeks before the
election, inevitably absorb some of the eects of spending during the campaign.
9
Table 2 about here.
The fourth column of Table 2 shows the results with all cases pooled together, analo-
gous to Abramowitz's model, and also comparable to the column 5 of Table 1, but with
the addition of two CQ variables. Here, CQ categorization helps to predict the vote
independent of our expected-vote measure, but just as Abramowitz observed, we nd a
non-signicant coecient for incumbent spending. But this is because simply throwing
these variables into the regression does not capture the theoretical nding that spend-
ing is varying systematically with closeness. Hence, we consider the rst three columns,
showing the regressions separately by degree of CQ-derived \safeness."
In column 1 we observe the OLS results for CQ-dened close races. For this group,
our expected vote measure is of little importance for predicting the outcome. Crucially,
incumbent spending is statistically signicant and, for the rst time among our sets of
equations, larger in absolute magnitude
10
than the coecient for challenger spending.
This result contrasts with that shown in column 3 at the other end of the safety
spectrum. For the vast bulk of contests deemed \safe" for the incumbent, the coecient
for incumbent spending is nonsignicant, as if incumbent spending did not matter. For
these races the simultaneity distortion is present in its usual severe form, undiminished
by our sorting exercise.
In between the results for \close" and \safe" races are races that lean to the incum-
bent." Column 2 shows that in these races, the coecient for incumbent spending is
of lesser magnitude
11
than that for challenger spending. But the incumbent spending
coecient is statistically signicant, even with the evident simultaneity bias.
While the contrast among these results is startling by itself, let us focus on the
crucial set of \close" races where informed observers at the time saw the race as too
close to call. Here are the crucial districts that were seen to be most in play during the
actual election campaign. The incumbent spending coecient for this set of cases is even
slightly stronger than that for challengers. This results from a drastic reduction if not
elimination of the simultaneity bias. This reduction results in part because CQ ratings
take into account intangible sources of the vote, such as unexpectedly strong challengers
and incumbent scandals, that might aect incumbent and challenger spending. But also,
where CQ ratings are too close to call, the simultaneity bias is minimal in the rst place.
These are close races where residual unobserved cause of the vote (e.g., late-occurring
strong challenges or incumbent stumbles) would not aect the amount of new spending
even when undetected by the CQ indicator.
10
However, this dierence in magnitude is not statistically signicant. Using conventional signicance
levels, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that incumbent and challenger spending eects are equal.
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The null hypothesis of equal spending eects for incumbents and challengers is rejected at the .01
signicance level.
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3.4 Total Spending: Controlling for the Eect of Closeness on
Spending
From both the theoretical and empirical analysis above, it is clear that the basic problem
with OLS regressions on the pooled sample is that one does not control for that basic
source of simultaneity: both candidates spend more when elections are expected to be
close. Above, we used two crude measures of closeness, and broke down the sample into
those races where OLS should (theoretically) work, and those where it should fail. The
results were exactly as predicted. But this can be carried one step further, again without
resorting to the kinds of additional identication assumptions required by simultaneous
equations estimation. What is required is that we nd a variable that controls, not
for closeness, but for the positive correlation between both candidates' spending and
closeness. There is an obvious variable to use: Total Spending. Table 3 reports the
results of simple OLS regression on the pooled sample, including the control for total
spending.
12
Column 1 presents the results without the CQ closeness dummies, and
Column 2 includes these dummies.
Table 3 about here.
The ndings are quite remarkable. In both cases, the incumbent and challenger
spending coecients are both signicant and close in magnitude to each other. In fact,
the incumbent spending coecient is somewhat greater, although the dierence is not
statistically signicant in either case. As expected, the coecient on total spending is
signicantly negative and large in magnitude. A doubling of total spending is indicative
of a race where the incumbent can expect to receive between three and four percentage
points less of the two-party vote. There is no change to the nonspending coecients in
the regression.
4 Conclusion
This paper has examined a simple game-theoretical model of the spending game between
competing candidates for public oce, and shows how that model has strong implications
for a nonlinear relationship between expected incumbent share of the vote and spending
by both candidates. The theoretical model also has implications about the nature of the
simultaneity bias that is introduced by running OLS regressions using cross-sectional data
pooled across both safe and competitive districts. The key insight is that, in equilibrium,
total spending is continuously increasing in the expected closeness of the race. Because
total spending reaches a maximum when expected incumbent share of the vote is 50
percent, the slope of spending with respect to incumbent vulnerability in this range is
necessarily zero, so a sample that includes only close races (i.e. races where expected
incumbent share of the vote is in the neighborhood of 50%) will be immune from the
12
The actual variable we construct is the logarithm of total spending (in 1978 dollars) plus $10000.
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kind of simultaneity bias that plagues OLS regression on the full sample. This facilitates
a clean estimate of incumbent and challenger spending eects.
We demonstrate this theoretical nding using veteran incumbent U. S. House races
from 1974-1990. For close races, not only does incumbent spending pass the threshold
of statistical analysis, but our estimate of the size of this eect is statistically indistin-
guishable from the eect of challenger spending. Thus, for close races, a given amount
of spending wins about as large a share of the vote for an incumbent as for a challenger.
We also show clearly how the simultaneity problem is progressively more severe as one
move to elections that are less and less likely to be close. Two dierent measures of
expected closeness are employed, and both yield identical conclusions. The rst measure
combines pre-spending district long term partisan strength, short term national forces,
and lagged incumbent vote. The second measure uses the pre-election CQ categorization
of close races, incumbent leaning races, and safe races. Finally, since the theoretical
model indicates that spending eects can only be measured reliably if one controls for
the correlation between expected closeness and spending by both competing candidates,
we propose the inclusion of measure of total spending in the vote equation as an eective
means to overcome the simultaneity problem. We report the results of two dierent OLS
specications that include a measure of total spending, both of which suggest that this is
a successful estimation strategy { at least for close races { for dealing with this particular
form of simultaneity that arises in campaign spending games.
Our results have potentially important consequences for understanding the connection
between money and the incumbency advantage. Incumbents outspend challengers and,
according to our analysis, achieve about as great a bang for the buck. In popular discus-
sions, incumbents' advantage in resources is seen as a major source of the incumbency
advantage. Political scientists have hesitated to endorse this view, in part because of the
diculty of estimating spending eects. The full implications are complex and beyond
the scope of this paper, but the results reported in this paper should nally put to rest
any lingering doubt about the signicance (and similarity) of incumbent and challenger
spending eects.
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Table 1. OLS regression of Incumbent Vote on Spending.
Broken down by Expected Incumbent Vote. T-statistics in parenthesis.
All
< 52% 52-55% 55-58% > 58% Cases
Constant 50.55 16.72 34.21 54.10 53.92
(2.23) (0.48) (1.10) (17.52) (19.56)
log S
I
4.04 3.06 0.86 -0.10 0.07
(2.21) (3.64) (1.59) (-0.56) (0.38)
log S
C
-4.11 -4.37 -2.94 -3.41 -3.36
(-3.49) (-7.80) (-6.47) (-26.34) (-27.83)
Expected Vote 0.00 0.95 0.86 0.73 0.70
(0.00) (0.62) (0.59) (31.46) (36.07)
Adj. R
2
.193 .457 .291 .675 .722
SEE 5.23 4.55 4.99 5.26 5.24
N 40 77 119 1556 1792
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Table 2. OLS regression of Incumbent Vote on Spending.
Broken down by CQ categories of competitiveness. T-statistics in parenthesis.
CLOSE LEANING SAFE ALL
Constant 41.02 51.98 48.92 50.98
(3.59) (7.74) (16.26) (18.54)
log S
I
2.66 2.24 -0.27 0.09
(2.33) (4.56) (-1.48) (0.55)
log S
C
-2.31 -3.84 -2.64 -2.80
(-1.96) (-8.88) (-18.51) (-20.33)
Expected Vote 0.07 0.38 0.73 0.66
(0.70) (7.49) (35.06) (34.67)
Close -6.01
(-9.12)
I favored -2.27
(-5.00)
Adj. R
2
.048 .296 .643 .735
SEE 4.80 5.20 4.92 5.12
N 83 340 1369 1792
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Table 3. OLS regression of Incumbent Vote on Spending.
Including control for total spending. T-statistics in parenthesis.
Without With
CQ dummies CQ dummies
Constant 56.64 53.09
(20.14) (18.92)
log S
I
3.12 2.28
(4.34) (3.20)
log S
C
-2.46 -2.19
(-10.37) (-9.25)
Expected Vote 0.69 0.66
(36.09) (34.27)
Close -5.73
(-8.65)
I favored -2.13
(-5.30)
log Total Spending -3.95 -2.82
(-4.37) (-3.16)
Adj. R
2
.725 .736
SEE 5.21 5.10
N 1792 1792
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